Elna Marcado-Fehr vs Bruno Fehr

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 [Article 147 Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage; Article 36 - Psychological Incapacity]

FACTS:

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on installment. They got married in 1985.

In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties were divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.

Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna of the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

RULING:

No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All these elements are present in the case at bar. 

The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the common properties of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code. 

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Gonzales vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-Property Regime of void marriage]

FACTS:

After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza business.

In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties.   She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."

In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

RULING:

No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code.

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.   These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.  

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.   It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.   

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Tumlos vs Fernandez

G.R. No. 137650 April 12 2000

FACTS:

Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the Tumlos. Said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay P1,600/mo while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000/mo for the rental, which was not fulfilled by the Tumlos. When the Fernandez demanded the payment from the Tumlos of P84,000 from Toto and Gina Tumlos as unpaid rentals for 7 years and P143,600.00 from Guillerma as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but said demand were unheeded. Then they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000 in attorney's fees.

Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-vendee of the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. MTC promulgated its decision in January 1997.

Upon appeal to the RTC Guillerma et al alleged that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

RTC affirmed with the judgment of the MTC. CA reversed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that petitioner is the co-owner of the apartment.

RULING:

No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were the co-owners of the disputed property.

Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must be presented to be deemed as co-owner of the property acquired during the cohabitation. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the apartment building. She merely anchors her claim of co-ownership on her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. No other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. Her claim of having administered the property during their cohabitation is unsubstantiated, for there is nothing in the Article 148 of the FC provides that the administration of the property amounts to the contribution in its acquisition.

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Mallilin Jr. v Castillo

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriage]

FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely  out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

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Nicdao Cariño vs Yee Cariño

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships;  Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee  admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:

No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same.  By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs.  And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.

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Acre vs Yuttikki

G.R. No. 153029 September 27 2007 [Art 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriages]

FACTS:

Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting. Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki, married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married to Jose del Mar.

Sofronio died after more than 24 years of union with Evangeline.

The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject properties with his fund.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested properties.

RULING:
Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested properties.

The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.

The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the contested properties.  Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here.

The certificate of title on its face show that the one property were exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is well-settled that the words "married to" preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of Evangeline.

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Erlinda Agapay vs Carlina Palang

G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997

FACTS;

Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:

No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.

The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.  The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.  The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.  If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.  Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.  Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old.  The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.  Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

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