G.R. No. L-49542 September 12 1980 [Paternity and Filiation : Legitimate Children]
FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. Because of the affair, she and her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967, she gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth filed with the CFI a recognition and support against Antonio. The lower court dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and 256 of the Civil Code. CA reversed the decision and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio. CA denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin.
2) Whether or not Elizabeth may institute an action that would bastardized her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
RULING:
SC held that CA made judgement based on misapprehension of facts and the its finding of facts contradicted by evidence on record.
Under the
Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of Elizabeth and Crispin.
Rolando was born only 7 months after the incident took place, and also 7 months after their alleged separation. The birth of Rolando came more than 180 days following the celebration of said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between the spouses. The fact that the child was born in the rented house, normally delivered, and raised normally by the yaya, according to the testimony of the yaya Patrocinia Avila. If he was otherwise born prematurely, he would have needed to be placed under special care, attended by a physician.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of
respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence
of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in
the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only
one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of
the husband;
2. Living
separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious
illness of the husband.
Article
256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child
is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Hence, good morals and public policy require that a mother should
not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order
to obtain some benefit for herself.
The law is not willing that the child be declared
illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon
evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and
wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the husband
denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate.
With respect to
Article 257, it must be
emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the
child is that of the husband.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the
wife's testimony on the point would be unseemly and scandalous, not only
because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect
it may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the
chief sufferer thereby.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a
disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless
behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of
respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on
society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge
in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during
such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours.
This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be
a severe assault on morality.
