G.R. No. 176995, July 30 2008 [Unlawful detainer; forcible entry]
FACTS:
FACTS:
Danilo Harayo filed a complaint with the MTCC against Pablo Acaylar, son of the spouses Acaylar for forcible entry. He alleged that he acquired the property from the
spouses Acaylar by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on September 14 2004 and
took possession of the property at the same day.
Pablo countered that the subject property is a portion of
the entire property owned by his parents. He
is in possession the entire property since 1979 and he built his house on the
property and farmed the land. Harayo cannot definitely claim which portion of
the entire property he was able to buy from the spouses since the same was not
clearly delineated. He presented an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar attesting
that she sold the subject property to him for consideration and she did not
give Pablo authority to either administer or remain on the subject property.
MTCC rendered a Decision awarding to Danilo the possession
of the property, giving credence to Danilo's claim that he took immediate
possession after the execution of the Deed of Sale. On appeal, RTC affirmed the award of possession in favor of
Harayo and declared that the sale of the subject property by spouses Acaylar
vested ownership and possession of said property in Harayo, thus Acaylar's acts
of entering of subject property constitute forcible entry. CA denied Acaylar's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.
RULING:
No. We had long settled that the only question that the
courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the property; and they should not involve
the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be settled in the
proper court and in a proper action. Hence the Deed of Sale conferring
ownership of the subject property upon Harayo is irrelevant in the case
presented. The DoS did not automatically place him in physical possession of
the property.
In Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, we find that Pablo was in
peaceful possession of the subject
property prior to its sale to Harayo. Even if Pablo was not authorized by Zoila
as administrator, his possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by
his parents.
In Arcal v. Court of Appeals, The rule is that possession by
tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate
made by the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to comply with such
demand.
In this case, there is no showing that either Zoila or
Harayo made an express demand upon Pablo to vacate the property. In the absence
of an oral or written demand, Pablo’s possession of the subject property has
yet to become unlawful. The absence of
demand to vacate precludes us from treating this case, originally instituted as
one for forcible entry, as one of unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is
jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer.
