G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted
the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial
court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite
the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998,
RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in
Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way
back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in
the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the
affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be
resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law
had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of
the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into
force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the
Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is
a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in
the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental
but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and
by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
