FACTS;
Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second marriage with
Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a
parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their
names. She also purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was
later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation,
wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels
of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda.
They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought by
Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the respondents to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son.
CA reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage
be granted to Erlinda.
RULING:
No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land
cannot be granted to Erlinda.
The sale of the riceland was made
in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated
to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null
and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded
as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a
sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money
to buy the subject riceland. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only around 20
of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of
the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought
the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang
provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name
alone be placed as the vendee.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that
she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis
to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.
The transaction was properly a
donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As regards to the donation of
their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their
daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.
The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically
and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
