G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998 [Express Limitations to Power of Legislation; Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court]
FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private respondents from the administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
