CHAPTER FIVE:
Interpretation of Words and Phrases
IN GENERAL
· A word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trading meaning
· General rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law:
o Review of the WHOLE law involved as well as the INTENDMENT of law (not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone)
Victorias Milling Co. v. Social Security Commission
“compensation” to include all renumerations, except bonuses, allowances & overtime pay
Definition was amended: deleted “exceptions”
Legislative Intent: the amendment shows legislative intent that bonuses & overtime pay now included in employee’s renumeration.
Principle: by virtue of express substantial change in phraseology, whatever prior judicial or executive construction should give way to mandate of new law.
Peo. v. Venviaje
< Chiropractic>
ISSUE: Whether person who practiced chiropractic without having been duly licensed, may be criminally liable for violation of medical law.
HELD: Though term “practice of medicine,” chiropractic may in ordinary sense fall within its meaning; statutorily defined - includes manipulations employed in chiropractic; thus, one who practices chiropractic without license is criminally liable.
Chang Yung Fa v. Gianzon
< alien>
ISSUE: whether alien who comes into country as temporary visitor is an “immigrant?”
HELD: while “immigrant” in ordinary definition- “an alien who comes to the Philippines for permanent residence”; The Immigration Act makes own definition of term, which is “any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a non-immigrant.
The definition emphasizes an immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the Philippines either to reside TEMPORARILY or PERMANENTLY
Ernest v. CA
< RA 4166 & EO 900, 901>
· “sugarcane planter” is defined as a planter-owner of sugarcane plantation w/in particular sugar mill district, who has been allocated export and/or domestic & reserve sugar quotas.
· Statutory definition excludes emergency, non-quota, non-district and accommodation planters, they having no sugar quota. However, in 1955, quota system abolished
· With change in situation, illogical to continue adhering to previous definition that had lost their legal effect.
Amadora v. CA
· However, where statute remains unchanged, interpreted according to its clear and original mandate; until legislature taking into account changes subjected to be regulated, sees fit to enact necessary amendment.
Words construed in their ordinary sense
· General rule: In the absence of legislative intent, words and phrases should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank
A statute “exempts certain importations from tax and foreign exchange, which are actually used in the manufacture or preparation of local products, forming part thereof.”
“Forming part thereof” not to mean that the imported products have to be mixed mechanically, chemically, materially into the local product & lose its identity. It means that the imported article is needed to accomplish the locally manufactured product for export.
CIR v. Manila Business Lodge 761
“business” (if unqualified) in tax statute: plain and ordinary meaning to embrace activity or affair where profit is the purpose & livelihood is the motive.
In this case, a fraternal social club selling liquor at its clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members, without intention to obtain profit
Not engaged in business.
Phiippinel Association of Government Retirees v. GSIS
< “present value”>
STATUTE: “for those who are at least 65 yrs of age, lump sum payment of present value of annuity for the first 5 years, and future annuity to be paid monthly. Provided however, that there shall be no discount from annuity for the first 5 yrs. of those who are 65 yrs or over, on the day the law took effect.”
Vocabulary:
o lump sum - amount of money given in single payment
o annuity - amount of money paid to somebody yearly or at some other regular interval
Should there be discount from the present value of his annuity?
NO. Used in ordinary sense as said law grants to the retired employee substantial sum for his sustenance considering his age. Any doubt in this law should be ruled in his favor.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. v. CA
ISSUE: Whether transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations arising from transferor’s illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire, which was committed prior to the transfer
Sec. 61 of PD 705 “the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor.”
HELD: Court held that the transferee is NOT liable and explained: “Obligations” construed to mean obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary course of business. Not those as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of transferor.
Principle: Construe using ordinary meaning & avoid absurdity.
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v CA
STATUTE: Sec. 68 PD 705 - penalizes the cutting, gathering & or collecting timber or other forest products without a license.
ISSUE: WN “lumber” included in “timber”
HELD: Reversing first ruling, SC says lumber is included in timber.
“The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of timber or lumber. Timber is included in definition of forestry products par (q) Sec.3. Lumber - same definitions as “processing plants”
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for processing of logs & other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood etc… p. 183.
Simply means, lumber is a processed log or forest raw material. The Code uses lumber in ordinary common usage. In 1993 ed. of Webster’s International Dictionary, lumber is defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. Therefore, lumber is a processed log or timber. Sec 68 of PD 705 makes no distinction between raw & processed timber.
General words construed generally
· Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda - what is generally spoken shall be generally understood; general words shall be understood in a general sense.
· Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum - a general statement is understood in a general sense
· In case word in statute has both restricted and general meaning, GENERAL must prevail; Unless nature of the subject matter & context in which it is employed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC
· “foreigner”- in Election Code, prohibiting any foreigner from contributing campaign funds includes juridical person
· “person”- comprehends private juridical person
· “person”- in penal statute, must be a “person in law,” an artificial or natural person
Vargas v. Rillaroza
· “judge” without any modifying word or phrase accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense to comprehend all kinds of judges; inferior courts or justices of SC.
C & C Commercial Corp v. NAWASA
· “government” - without qualification should be understood in implied or generic sense including GOCCs.
Central Bank v. CA
· “National Government” - refers only to central government, consisting of executive, legislative and judiciary, as well as constitutional bodies ( as distinguished from local government & other governmental entities) Versus->
· “The Government of the Republic of the Philippines” or “Philippine Government” – including central governments as well as local government & GOCCs.
Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Customs
· “product of the Philippines” – any product produced in the country, e.g. bran (ipa) & pollard (darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines”
Generic term includes things that arise thereafter
· Progressive interpretation - A word of general signification employed in a statute, in absence of legislative intent, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at its time of enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well
· Rationale: to keep statute from becoming ephemeral (short-lived) and transitory (not permanent or lasting).
· General rule in StatCon: Legislative enactments in general comprehensive operation, apply to persons, subjects and businesses within their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage.
Geotina v. CA
· “articles of prohibited importation” - used in Tariff and Customs Code embrace not only those declared prohibited at time of adoption, but also goods and articles subject of activities undertaken in subsequent laws.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC
· “any election” - not only the election provided by law at that time, but also to future elections including election of delegates to Constitutional Convention
Words with commercial or trade meaning
·Words or phrases common among merchants and traders, acquire commercial meanings.
·When any of words used in statute, should be given such trade or commercial meaning as has been generally understood among merchants.
·Used in the following: tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws for the government of the importer.
·The law to be applicable to his class, should be construed as universally understood by importer or trader.
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. CIR
No tax shall be collected on articles which, before its taking effect, shall have been “disposed of”
Lay: parting away w/ something
Merchant: to sell (this must be used)
San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council of Mandaue
(“gross value of money”)
Merchant: “gross selling price” which is the total amount of money or its equivalent which purchaser pays to the vendor to receive the goods.
Words with technical or legal meaning
·General rule: words that have, or have been used in, a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been PREVIOUSLY used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words
·Presumption: language used in a statute, which has a technical or well-known meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature
Manila Herald Publishing Co. v. Ramos
Sec 14 of Rule 59 of Rules of Court which prescribes the steps to be taken when property attached is claimed by a person other than the defendant or his agent
STATUTE: “nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.”
ISSUE: “proper action” limits the 3rd party’s remedy to intervene in the action in which the writ of attachment is issued
HELD: “action” has acquired a well-defined meaning as an “ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or prevent redress or wrong…
While…
Sec 2 Rule 2 of Rules of Court; “Commencement of Action”
STATUTE: “Civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the proper court”
Word: commencement - indicates the origination of entire proceeding
It was appropriate to use proper action (in 1st statute) than intervention, since asserted right of 3rd party claimant necessarily flows out of pending suit; if the word ‘intervention’ is used, it becomes strange.
Malanyaon v. Lising
Sec. 13 of Anti-Graft Law
STATUTE: “ if a public officer is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during the suspension”
ISSUE: Will a public officer whose case has been dismissed not “acquitted” be entitled to benefits in Sec. 13?
HELD: No. Acquittal (legal meaning) - finding of not guilty based on the merit.
Dismissal does not amount to acquittal except when, the dismissal comes after the prosecution has presented all its evidence and is based on insufficiency of such evidence.
Rura v. Lopena
Probation law - Disqualified from probation those: “who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month & a fine of no less than Php 200.”
ISSUE: “previously convicted”
HELD: it refers to date of conviction, not date of commission of crime; thus a person convicted on same date of several offenses committed in different dates is not disqualified.
How identical terms in the statute construed
·General rule: a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute; unless a different intention is clearly expressed.
·Rationale: word used in statute in a given sense presumed to be used in same sense throughout the law..
De la Paz v. Court of Agrarian Relations
(Riceland)
· share tenancy - average produce per hectare for the 3 agricultural years next preceding the current harvest
· leasehold - according to normal average harvest of the 3 preceding yrs
· “Year”- agricultural year not calendar year
· “Agricultural year” - represents 1 crop; if in 1 calendar yr 2 crops are raised that’s 2 agricultural years.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
STATUTE: In Sec.1 , Art. XIII of 1935 Constitution - “public agricultural lands shall not be alienated” except in favor of Filipinos, SAME as Sec. 5 “no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned.”
Both have same meaning being based on same policy of nationalization and having same subject.
Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute
· Purpose may indicate whether to give word, phrase, ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or expansive meaning.
· In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of statute; even disregard technical or legal meaning in favor of construction which will effectuate intent or purpose.
Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions
· General rule: word, phrase, provision, should not be construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law.
· This is a VARIATION of the rule that, statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its provision must be given effect.
Claudio v. COMELEC
STATUTE (LGC): “No recall shall take place within 1 yr from the date of the official’s assumption of office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular election”
ISSUE: Does the 1st limitation embraces the entire recall proceedings (e.g. preparatory recall assemblies) or only the recall election?
HELD: the Court construed “recall” in relation to Sec.69 which states that, “the power of recall… shall be exercised by the registered voters of an LGU to which the local elective official belongs.”
· Hence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power vested in electorate is power to elect an official to office and not power to initiate recall proceedings.
· Word or provision should not be construed in isolation form but should be interpreted in relation to other provisions of a statute, or other statutes dealing on same subject in order to effectuate what has been intended.
Garcia v. COMELEC
History of statute:
o In the Constitution, it requires that legislature shall provide a system of initiative and referendum whereby people can directly approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body.
o Local Govt. Code, a later law, defines local initiative as “process whereby registered voters of an LGU may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.”
§ It is claimed by respondents that since resolution is not included in this definition, then the same cannot be subject of an initiative.
ISSUE: whether a local resolution of a municipal council can be subject to an initiative and referendum?
HELD: We reject respondent’s narrow and literal reading of above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 on initiative & referendum
The subsequent enactment of the LGC did not change the scope of its coverage. In Sec. 124 of the same code. It states: (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.”
This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiative to ordinances, but to all “subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact, which undoubtedly includes resolutions.”
Gelano v. C.A.
In Corporation Law, authorizes a dissolved corporation to continue as a body corporate for 3 yrs. for the purpose of defending and prosecuting suits by or against it, and during said period to convey all its properties to a “trustee” for benefits of its members, stockholders, creditors and other interested persons, the transfer of the properties to the trustee being for the protection of its creditors and stockholders.
Word “trustee” - not to be understood in legal or technical sense, but in GENERAL concept which would include a lawyer to whom was entrusted the prosecution of the cases for recovery of sums of money against corporation’s debtors.
Republic v. Asuncion
STATUTE: RA 6975 which makes criminal actions involving members of the PNP come “within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court within the meaning of R.A. 6975?
Used “regular courts” & “civil courts” interchangeably
Court martial - not courts within the Philippine Judicial System; they pertain to the executive department and simply instrumentalities of the executive power.
Regular courts - those within the judicial department of the government namely the SC and lower courts which includes the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Courts considered the purpose of the law which is to remove from the court martial, the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within the judicial system.
Molina v. Rafferty
ISSUE: Whether “Agricultural products” includes domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds.
STATUTE: Phrase used in tax statute which exempts such products from payment of taxes, purpose is to encourage the development of such resources.
HELD: phrase not only includes vegetable substances but also domestic and domesticated animals, animal products, and fish or bangus grown in ponds. Court gave expansive meaning to promote object of law.
Munoz & Co. v. Hord
ISSUE: “Consumption” limited or broad meaning
STATUTE: word is used in statute which provides that “except as herein specifically exempted, there shall be paid by each merchant and manufacturer a tax at the rate of 1/3 of 1% on gross value of money in all goods, wares and merchandise sold, bartered, or exchanged for domestic consumption.
HELD: Considering the purpose of the law, which is to tax all merchants except those expressly exempted, it is reasonable and fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial use and not in limited sense of total destruction of thing sold.
Mottomul v. de la Paz
ISSUE: Whether the word “court” refers to the Court of Appeals or the trial court?
STATUTE: RA 5343 Effect of Appeal- Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing & on such terms as it may deem just should provide otherwise.
HELD: It refers to the TRIAL COURT. If the adverse party intends to appeal from a decision of the SEC and pending appeal desires to stay the execution of the decision, then the motion must be filed with and be heard by the SEC before the adverse party perfects its appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Purpose of the law: the need for immediacy of execution of decisions arrived at by said bodies was imperative.
Meaning of term dictated by context
· The context in which the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense
· Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam- a word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.
People v. Chavez
STATUTE: Family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except for “nonpayment of debts”
Word “debts” – means obligations in general.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
STATUTE: lands were classified into timber, mineral and agricultural
Word “agricultural” – used in broad sense to include all lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such being the context in which the term is used.
Santulan v. Executive. Secretary.
Statute: A riparian owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores of banks of navigable lakes shall have preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property.
FACT: Riparian - one who owns land situated on the banks of river.
HELD: Used in a more broader sense referring to a property having a water frontage, when it mentioned “foreshore lands,” “marshy lands,” or “lands covered with water.”
Peo. v. Ferrer
(case where context may limit the meaning)
Word: “Overthrow”
STATUTE: Anti-Subversion Act “knowingly & willfully and by overt acts.”
Rejects the metaphorical “peaceful” sense & limits its meaning to “overthrow” by force or violence.
Peo. v. Nazario
STATUTE: Municipal tax ordinance provides “any owner or manager of fishponds” shall pay an annual tax of a fixed amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of the fishponds is the government which leased them to a private person who operates them
Word: “Owner” – does not include government as the ancient principle that government is immune from taxes.
Where the law does not distinguish
· Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus - where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
· Corollary principle: General words or phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance
· Corollary principle: where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there a compelling reason to justify it.
Application: when legislature laid down a rule for one class, no difference to other class.
Presumption: that the legislature made no qualification in the general use of a term.
Robles v. Zambales Chromite Co.
STATUTE: grants a person against whom the possession of “any land” is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer.
HELD: any land not exclusive to private or not exclusively to public; hence, includes all kinds of land.
Director of Lands v. Gonzales
STATUTE: authorizes the director of lands to file petitions for cancellation of patents covering public lands on the ground therein provided.
HELD: not distinguished whether lands belong to national or local government
SSS v. City of Bacolod
ISSUE: exempts the payment of realty taxes to “properties owned by RP”
HELD: no distinction between properties held in sovereign, governmental, or political capacity and those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial character.
Velasco v. Lopez
STATUTE: certain “formalities” be followed in order that act may be considered valid.
HELD: no distinction between essential or non-essential formalities
Colgate-Palmolive Phils v. Gimenez
STATUTE: does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream
Oliva v. Lamadrid
STATUTE: allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead property w/in 5 years from its conveyance
HELD: “conveyance” not distinguished - voluntary or involuntary.
Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery Inc.
STATUTE: grants employee “leaves of absence with pay”
HELD: “with pay” refers to full pay and not to half or less than full pay; to all leaves of absence and not merely to sick or vacation leaves.
Olfato v. COMELEC
STATUTE: makes COMELEC the sole judge of “all pre- proclamation controversies”
HELD : “all” – covers national, provincial, city or municipal
Phil. British Assurance Co. v. Intermediate Apellate Court
STATUTE: A counterbond is to secure the payment of “any judgment,” when execution is returned unsatisfied
HELD: “any judgment” includes not only final and executory but also judgment pending appeal whose execution ordered is returned unsatisfied.
Ramirez v. CA
STATUTE: “Act to Prohibit & Penalize Wire Tapping and Other related Violations of Private Communications and Other Purposes”
“It shall be unlawful, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement…”
ISSUE: Whether violation thereof refers to the taping of a communication other than a participant to the communication or even to the taping by a participant who did not secure the consent of the party to the conversations.
HELD: Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be penalized ought to be party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to make any such recording, underscored by “any”
Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v. CIR
STATUTE: imposes a “specific tax” on cigarettes containing Virginia tobacco …. Provided that of the length exceeds 71 millimeters or the weight per thousand exceeds 1¼ kilos, the tax shall be increased by 100%.
ISSUE: whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filters should be excluded therefrom, so that tax would come under the general provision and not under the proviso?
HELD: Not having distinguished between filter and non-filter cigars, court should not distinguish.
Tiu San v. Republic
ISSUE: whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization for violation of a municipal ordinance would disqualify him from taking his oath as a citizen.
STATUTE: An applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen after 2 years from the promulgation of the decision granting his petition for naturalization if he can show that during the intervening period “he has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government rules”
HELD: law did not make any distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. Conviction of the applicant from violation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and precludes applicant from taking his oath.
Peralta v. CSC
ISSUE: whether provision of RA 2625, that government employees are entitled to 15 days vacation leaves of absence with full pay and 15 days sick leaves with full pay, exclusives of Saturday, Sundays or holidays in both cases, applies only to those who have leave credits and not to those who have none.
HELD: Law speaks of granting of a right and does not distinguish between those who have accumulated and those who have none.
Pilar v. COMELEC
· STATUTE: RA 7166 provides that “Every candidate shall, within 30 days after the day of the election file xxx true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
· HELD: Law did not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through and one who withdrew it.
“Every candidate” refers to one who pursued and even to those who withdrew his candidacy.
Sanciagco v. Rono
(where the distinction appears from the statute, the courts should make the distinction)
STATUTE: Sec 13 of BP Blg. 697 which provides that: “Any person holding public appointive or position shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy”
Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians or barangay officials shall upon the filing of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office
FACTS: an elective Barangay. Captain was elected President of Association of Barangay Councils and pursuant thereto appointed by the President as member of the Sanggunian Panlungsod. He ran for Congress but lost.
ISSUE: He then wants to resume his duties as member of sangguniang panlungsod. He was merely forced on leave when he ran for Congress.
HELD: the Secretary of Local Government denied his request; being an appointive sanggunian member, he was deemed automatically resigned when he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Garvida v. Sales, Jr.
ISSUE: whether petitioner who was over 21 but below 22 was qualified to be an elective SK member
Statute: Sec.424 of the LGC provides that a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must not be 21 yrs old.
· Sec. 428 as additional requirement provides that elective official of Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 yrs. “on the day of election”
HELD: the distinction is apparent: the member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of Katipunan ng Kabataan. But the elective official, must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of election.
Disjunctive and conjunctive words
· Word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each other.
Peo v. Martin
STATUTE: Sec. 40 of Commonwealth Act 61, punishes “any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer…
does not justify giving the word a disjunctive meaning, since the words “bring into” “land”, “conceals” and “harbors” being four separate acts each possessing its distinctive, different and disparate meaning.
CIR v. Manila Jockey Club
STATUTE: imposes amusement taxes on gross receipts of “proprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement place”
HELD: “or” implies that tax should be paid by either proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be, single & not by all at the same time.
Use of “or” between 2 phrases connotes that either phrase serves as qualifying phrase.
“or” means “and”, WHEN THE SPIRIT OR CONTEXT OF THE LAW SO WARRANTS
Trinidad v. Bermudez (e.g. of “or” to mean “and”)
· Statute: Sec. 2, Rule 112 of Rules of Court authorizing municipal judges to conduct “preliminary examination or investigation”
· “or” equivalent of “that is to say”
SMC v. Municipality of Mandaue (e.g. of “or” equivalent of “that is to say”)
Ordinance: imposes graduated quarterly fixed tax
“based on the gross value in money or actual market value” of articles; phrase “or actual market value” intended to explain “gross value in money.”
· “or” means successively
STATUTE: Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code - “the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian….”
Although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, provision must be construed as meaning that the right to institute a criminal proceeding is exclusively and successively reposed in said persons in the order mentioned, no one shall proceed if there is any person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to institute the action.
· “And” is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning “together with,” “joined with,” “along with,” “added to or linked to”
o Never to mean “or”
o Used to denote joinder or union
· “and/or” - means that effect should be give to both conjunctive and disjunctive term
o term used to avoid construction which by use of disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.
ASSOCIATED WORDS
Noscitur a sociis
· where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
· to remove doubt refer to the meaning of associated or companion words
Buenaseda v. Flavier
· Statute: Sec. 13(3), Art XI of the Constitution grants Ombudsman power to “Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution.
· “suspension” – is a penalty or punitive measure not preventive
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
· Stat: Sec. 458 of LGC authorized local government units to prevent or suppress “Gambling & other prohibited games of chance.”
· “Gambling” – refers only to illegal gambling, like other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed & not to gambling authorized by specific statutes.
Carandang v. Santiago
ISSUE: Whether an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during pendency of criminal action for frustrated homicide.
STATUTE: Art. 33 of Civil Code “in case of defamation, fraud, & physical injuries…”
HELD: Court ruled that “physical injuries” not as one defined in RPC, but to mean bodily harm or injury such as physical injuries, frustrate homicide, or even death.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
ISSUE: Whether proceedings in civil cases pending in court under the so called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation are affected by the proclamation of Gen. McArthur issued on October 23, 1944 that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect.”
· “Processes” does not refer to judicial processes but to the executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by the President of so-called RP, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word “processes” is associated.
Commissioner of Customs v. Phil. Acetylene Co.
· STATUTE: Sec. 6 of RA 1394 provides that “tax provided for in Sec. 1 of this Act shall not be imposed against the importation into the Philippines of machinery or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industry xxx; machinery equipment, spare parts, for use of industries…”
· ISSUE: Is the word “industries” used in ordinary, generic sense, which means enterprises employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor?
· HELD: Since “industries” used in the law for the 2nd time “is classified together” with the terms miners, mining industries, planters and farmers, obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture such as those miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers. If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and illogical
Peo. v. Santiago
· Libel: committed by means of “writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, cinematographic exhibiton.” It is argued that “amplifier” similar to radio.
· ISSUE: Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel?
· HELD: No. Radio should be considered as same terms with writing and printing whose common characteristic is the “permanent means of publication.”
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC
· ISSUE: Whether claim of an employee against his employer for cash reward or submitting process to eliminate defects in quality & taste of San Miguel product falls within jurisdiction of the labor arbiter of NLRC?
· HELD: No. Outside of jurisdiction. Not necessary that entire universe of money claims under jurisdiction of labor arbiter but only those to 1.) unfair labor practices, 2.) claims concerning terms & conditions of employment 4.) claims relating to household services 5.) activities prohibited to employers & employees.
· STATUTE: “jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, as last amended by BP Blg. 227 including paragraph 3 “all money claims of workers, including hose based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.”
Ebarle v. Sucaldito
· STATUTE: EO 265 outlines the procedure which complainants charging government officials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, applies to criminal actions or complaints.
· EO 265 – “complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplines and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted”
· HELD: executive order does not apply to criminal actions. The term is closely overshadowed by the qualification - “After administrative remedies shall have been exhausted,” which suggest civil suits subject to previous administrative actions.
Mottomul v. dela Paz
· ISSUE: Whether the word ‘court’ in Sec 5, Art 5434: Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case,” refers to the CA or to the Court of Agrarian Relations?
· HELD: Correct construction made clear with reference to Sec. 1 of RA 5434, where the court, officers or bodies whose decision, award are appealable to the Court of Appeals, enumerated as follows: Court of Agrarian Relations, Sec. of Labor, Social Security Commission etc…; From grouping, the enumeration in Sec. 5 means Court of Agrarian Relations not CA.
Ejusdem generis (or the same kind or species)
· General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
· Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.
· Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the specific words.
· Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particularization
Mutuc v. COMELEC
· Statute: Act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials and the like”
· Held: and the like, does not embrace taped jingles for campaign purposes
Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs
STATUTE: Dynamos, generators, exciters, and other machinery for the generation of electricity for lighting or for power;
HELD: phrase “other machinery” would not include steam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same kind of machinery with dynamos, generators and exciters.
Vera v. Cuevas
STATUTE: all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with words: “This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than 1 year of age”
HELD: restricts the phrase “all milk in whatever form,” excluded filled milk.
Graphilon v. Municipal Court of Cigara
STATUTE: the vice-mayor shall be entitled to assume the office of the mayor during the absence, suspension or other temporary disability
HELD: anything which disables the mayor from exercising the power and prerogatives of his office, since “their temporary disability” follows the words “absence” and “suspension”
Peo. v. Magallanes
Where a law grants a court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide “offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office,” the phrase “IN RELATION TO THEIR OFFICE” qualifies or restricts the offense to one which cannot exist without the office, or the office is a constituent element of the crime defined in the statute or one perpetuated in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions
Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc. v. Bord of Tax Appeals
ISSUE: whether losses due to the war were to be deductible from gross income of 1945 when they were sustained, or in 1950 when Philippine War Damage Commission advised that no payment would be made for said losses?
STATUTE: “In the case of a corporation, all losses actually sustained and not charged off within the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”
Contention: the assurances of responsible public officials before the end of 1945 that property owners would be compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed to place the losses within the phrase “compensated xxx otherwise” than by insurance
HELD: Rejected! “Otherwise” in the clause “compensated for by insurance or otherwise” refers to compensation due under a title analogous or similar to insurance. Inasmuch as the latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it follows that in order to be deemed “compensated for xxx ‘otherwise,’ the losses sustained by a taxpayer must be covered by a judicially enforceable right, springing from any of the juridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, quasi-contract, torts, or crimes,” and not mere pronouncement of public officials
Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople
ISSUE: Whether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled to service incentive leave benefits as against the claim that they are not so?
STATUTE: Rule V of IRR of Labor Code: “This rule (on service incentive leaves) shall apply to all employees, except “filed personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis.”
HELD: “those who were employed on task or contract basis” should be related with “field personnel,” apply the principle, clearly teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitled to service incentive leave benefits.
Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA
ISSUE: whether the phrase “other lawful beverages” which gives protection to manufacturer with the Phil. Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles used for “soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages,” includes hard liquor?
Statute title: “An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, & other similar containers.”
HELD: The title clearly shows intent to give protection to all marked bottles of all lawful beverages regardless of nature of contents.
National Power Corp. v. Angas
ISSUE: whether the term judgment, refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest.
STATUTE: Central Bank Circular No. 416 – “by virtue of the authority granted to it under Sec. 1 of Act Number 2655, as amended, otherwise known as Usury Law, the Monetary Board in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest for loan or forbearance of any money, good or credit & the rate allowed in judgment in the absence of express contract shall be 12% per annum.
HELD: Judgments should mean only judgments involving loans or forbearance money, goods or credit, these later specific terms having restricted the meaning “judgments” to those same class or the same nature as those specifically enumerated.
Republic v. Migrino
FACTS: retired military officer was investigated by the PCGG for violation of Anti-Graft Act in relation to EO 1 & 2 authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth from the former President’s “subordinates and close associates.”
ISSUE: Does PCGG have jurisdiction to investigate such military officer for being in service during the administration of the former President?
HELD: “Subordinates” refers only to one who enjoys close association or relation to the former President and his wife; term “close associates” restricted the meaning of “subordinates.”
Limitations of ejusdem generis
· Requisites:
o Statute contains an enumeration of particular & specific words, followed by general word or phrase
o Particular and specific words constitute a class or are the same kind
o Enumeration of the particular & specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples
o There is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broader meaning
· Rule of ejusdem generis, is not of universal application; it should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the law.
US v. Santo Nino
STATUTE: It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or other deadly weapon. Provided prohibition shall not apply to firearms who have secured a license or who are entitled to carry the same under the provisions of this Act.”
ISSUE: does “the deadly weapon” include an unlicensed revolver?
HELD: Yes! Carrying such would be in violation of statute. By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein specified.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission
ISSUE: a religious institution invoking ejusdem generi whether ‘employer” be limited to undertaking an activity which has an element of profit or gain?
STATUTE: “any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business, industry…. and uses the services of another person, who under his orders as regard the employment, except the Government, and any of its political subdivisions branches or instrumentalities and GOCCs”.
HELD: No. the rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. The definition is sufficiently comprehensive to include charitable institutions and charities not for profit; it contained exceptions which said institutions and entities are not included.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
· The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
· Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:
o Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
o Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis - A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule
o Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been expressed; opposite the doctrine of necessary implication
Negative-opposite doctrine
· Argumentum a contrario- what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Chung Fook v. White
STATUTE: case exempts the wife of a naturalized American from detention, for treatment in a hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious disease.
HELD: Court denied petition for writ of habeas corpus (filed by the native-born American citizen on behalf of wife detained in hospital), court resorted to negative-opposite doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to wife of a naturalized citizen & cannot interpolate “native-born” citizen.
Court’s application results to injustice (as should not discriminate against native-born citizens), which is not intent of law, should have used doctrine of necessary implication.
Application of expression unius rule
· Generally used in construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, imposing rights & forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly construed.
Acosta v. Flor
STATUTE: specifically designates the persons who may bring actions for quo warranto, excludes others from bringing such actions.
Escribano v. Avila
STATUTE: for libel, “preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamation xxx shall be conducted by the city fiscal of province or city or by municipal court of city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such preliminary investigations
Peo. v. Lantin
STATUTE: crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness; crimes such as slander can be prosecuted de oficio.
Vera v. Fernandez
STATUTE: All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against decedent, must be filled within the time limit of the notice, otherwise barred forever.
HELD: The taxes due to the government, not being mentioned in the rule are excluded from the operation of the rule.
Mendenilla v. Omandia
STATUTE: changed the form of government of a municipality into a city provides that the incumbent mayor, vice-mayor and members of the municipal board shall continue in office until the expiration of their terms.
HELD: all other municipal offices are abolished.
Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
· STATUTE: Legislature deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, as when a co-owner is given the right of legal redemption within 30 days from notice in writing by the vendor in case the other co-owner sells his share is the co-owned property,
· HELD: the method of giving notice must be deemed excusive & a notice sent by vendee is ineffective.
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
· STATUTE: Local Autonomy Act, local governments are given broad powers to tax everything, except those which are specifically mentioned therein. If a subject matter does not come within the exceptions, an ordinance imposing a tax on such subject matter is deemed to come within the broad taxing power, exception firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
Samson v. Court of Appeals
· Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature and enumerates those in the noncompetitive as including SECRETARIES OF GOVERNORS AND MAYORS, the clear intent is that assistant secretaries of governors and mayors fall under the competitive service, for by making an enumeration, the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for otherwise it would have included them in the enumeration
Firman General Insurance Corp. v. CA
FACTS: The insurance company disclaimed liability since death resulting from murder was impliedly excluded in the insurance policy as the cause of death is not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act, excluded by the very nature of a personal accident insurance.
ISSUE: WN the insurance company is still liable for the injury suffered by the insured resulting from intentional act.
HELD: Yes. The principle “expresssio unius est exclusio - the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other thing - not having been expressly included in the enumeration of circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks lead inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
ISSUE: whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i.e., renovation of church without securing permit fro Department of Social Services, is a violation of PD 1564, making it a criminal offense for a person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes.
HELD: No. Charitable and religious specifically enumerated only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Limitations of the rule
1. It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory construction
2. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, no more than auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
3. Does not apply where enumeration is by way of example or to remove doubts only.
Gomez v. Ventura
· ISSUE: whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a patient whose physical condition did not require the use of such drug constitutes “unprofessional conduct” as to justify revocation of physician’s license to practice
· HELD: Still liable! Rule of expressio unius not applicable.
Court said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified, there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed ‘unprofessional.’ Nor can it be convincingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of ‘unprofessional’ conduct therefore deemed grounds for revocation of licenses
4. Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provision to particular persons or things enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them.
5. If it will result in incongruities or a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
6. If adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public interest.
Doctrine of casus omissus
· A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
· The maxim operates only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein.
· Exception: where legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language
Doctrine of last antecedent
Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not those which are distantly or remotely located.
Rule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent.
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia – relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires
Pangilinan v. Alvendia
· Members of the family of the tenant includes the tenant’s son, son-in-law, or grandson, even though they are not dependent upon him for support and living separately from him BECAUSE the qualifying phrase “who are dependent upon him for support” refers solely to its last antecedent, namely, “such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not”
Florentino v. PNB
ISSUE: whether holders of backpay certificates can compel government-owned banks to accept said certificates in payment of the holder’s obligations to the bank.
STATUTE: “obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to any citizens of the Philippines or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such settlement.”
HELD: the court, invoking the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase qualify only to its last antecedent namely “any citizen of the Philippines or association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.” The court held that backpay certificate holders can compel government-owned banks to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations with the bank.
Qualifications of the doctrine.
1. Subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to the whole.
2. Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to qualify the antecedent at all.
Reddendo singular singuilis
· Variation of the doctrine of last antecedent
· Referring each to each;
· Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should be taken distributively.
Peo. v Tamani
· ISSUE: when to count the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgment of conviction of criminal action—date of promulgation of judgment or date of receipt of notice of judgment.
· STATUTE: Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
· HELD: Should be from ‘promulgation’ should be referring to ‘judgment,’ while notice refer to order.
King v. Hernandez
· ISSUE: Whether a Chinese holding a noncontrol position in a retail establishment, comes within the prohibition against aliens intervening “in the management, operation, administration or control” followed by the phrase “whether as an officer, employee or laborer…
· HELD: Following the principle, the entire scope of personnel activity, including that of laborers, is covered by the prohibition against the employment of aliens.
Amadora v. CA
· ISSUE: whether Art 2180 of Civil Code, which states that “lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody” applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic
· HELD: teachers à pupils and students; heads of establishments of arts and trades to à apprentices
General rule: responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student (where school is academic)
Exception: responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the head, and only he, (who) shall be held liable (in case of the establishments of arts and trades; technical or vocational in nature)
PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND CLAUSES
Provisos, generally
· to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or provision of a statute, or except something, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by legislature to be brought within its purview.
· Rule: restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting clause or section which it refers.
· Purpose: limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it.
· Location: commonly found at the end of a statute, or provision & introduced, as a rule, by the word “Provided”.
· Determined by: What determines whether a clause is a proviso is its substance rather than its form. If it performs any of the functions of a proviso, then it will be regarded as such, irrespective of what word or phrase is used to introduce it.
Proviso as additional legislation
· Expressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute
· Would mean exactly the reverse of what is necessarily implied when read in connection with the limitation
· Purpose:
o To limit generalities
o Exclude from the scope of the statute that which otherwise would be within its terms
What proviso qualifies
· General rule: qualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately preceding it; or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows.
U.S. v. Santo Nino
· STATUTE: it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or any other deadly weapon: Provided, that this provision shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to same under provisions of this Act.
· HELD: through the Proviso it manifested the intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas as specified.
Chinese Flour Importers Assn v. Price Stabilization Board
· STATUTE: Sec. 15 RA 426 - Any existing law, executive order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no government agency except the Import Control Commission shall allocate the import quota among the various importers. Provided, That the Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade Administration shall have exclusive power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers.”
· ISSUE: whether or not the proviso excluded wheat flour from the scope of act itself.
· HELD: NO! Proviso refer to the clause immediately preceding it and can have no other meaning than that the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of assigning to Import Control Commission was assigned to PRTA. If wheat flour is exempted from the provisions of the Act, the proviso would have been placed in the section containing the repealing clause
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles
· When an earlier section of statute contains proviso, not embodied in later section, the proviso, not embodied in a later section thereof, in the absence of legislative intent, be confined to qualify only the section to which it has been appended.
Flores v. Miranda
· ISSUE: Petitioner that approval of the Public Service Commission of the sale of public service vehicle was not necessary because of proviso in Sec. 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 146
· STATUTE: It shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission previously had xxx to sell, alienate xxx its property, franchise; Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of business”
· HELD:
o the proviso xxx means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and binding between the parties; also
o the phrase “in the ordinary course of business xxx could not have been intended to include sale of vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment.
Mercado Sr. v. NLRC
· Held: the proviso in par 2 of Art 280 relates only to casual employees; not to project employees.
· Applying rule that proviso to be construed with reference to immediately preceding part of the provision which it is attached and not to other sections thereof, unless legislative intent was to restrict or qualify.
Exception to the rule
· Proviso construed to qualify only the immediately preceding part of the section to which it is attached; if no contrary legislative intent is indicated.
· Where intent is to qualify or restrict the phrase preceding it or the earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole, then the proviso will be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between proviso and main provision
· Where there is a conflict between the proviso and the main provision, that which is located in a later portion of the statute prevails, unless there is legislative intent to the contrary.
Exceptions, generally
· Exception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the provision from which it is excepted.
· It is a clause which exempts something from the operation of a statute by express words.
· “except,” “unless otherwise,” and “shall not apply”
· Function: to confirm the general rule; qualify the words or phrases constituting the general rule.
· Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus exceptis - A thing not being excepted, must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.
Exception
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Proviso
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· Exempts something absolutely from the operation of statute
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· Defeats its operation conditionally.
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· Takes out of the statute something that otherwise would be a part of the subject matter of it.`
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· Avoids by way of defeasance or excuse
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· Part of the enactment itself, absolutely excluding from its operation some subject or thing that would otherwise fall within the scope.
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· If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new provision, by way of amendment, providing conditionally for a new case- this is the nature of proviso.
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In a way since one of the functions of proviso is to except something from an enacting clause.
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MERALCO v. Public Utilities Employees’ Association
· STATUTE: No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place shall compel an employee or laborer to work on Sundays& legal holidays, unless paid an additional sum of at least 25% of his renumeration: Provided, that this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing public service, e.g. supplying gas, electricity, power, water etc…
· ISSUE: W/N MERALCO is liable to pay the 25% for employees who work during holidays and Sundays.
· HELD: No. Second part is an exception although introduced by “Provided.” As appellant is a public utility that supplies electricity & provides means of transportation, it is evident that appellant is exempt from qualified prohibition established in the enactment clause.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
· STATUTE: No bill shall be passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, & printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members 3 days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
· HELD: It qualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is the distribution of the printed bill in its final form 3 days from its final passage.& not the 3 readings on separate days.
Pendon v. Diasnes
· ISSUE: whether a person convicted of a crime against property, who was granted absolute pardon by the President, is entitled to vote?
· STATUTE: A person shall not be qualified to vote “who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more from imprisonment, such disability not having been removed any plenary pardon” or “who has been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.”
· 1st clause- 2 exceptions – (a) Person penalized by less than 1 yr.; and (2) Person granted an absolute pardon
· 2nd clause - creates exception to 1st but not to 2nd that a person convicted of crime against property cannot vote unless there’s pardon.
· HELD: absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner to his political rights.
If penalty less 1 yr, disqualification not apply, except when against property- needs pardon.
The second clause creates the exception to the first.
Gorospe v. CA
(exception need not be introduced by “except” or “unless”)
· Statute: Rule 27 of Rules of Court, “service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if fail to claim his mail from the post office within 5 days from ate of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.”
· Issue: Whether actual receipt the date of a registered mail after 5 day period, is the date from which to count the prescriptive period to comply with certain requirements.
· Held: Service is completed on the 5th day after the 1st notice, even if he actually received the mail months later.
· 2nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with ‘but’ which indicates exception.
Saving clause
· Provision of law which operates to except from the effect of the law what the clause provides, or save something which would otherwise be lost.
· Used to save something from effect of repeal of statute
