PEÑAFLOR VS PANIS


117 SCRA 953 10/27/1982

FACTS:

Petitioner who actually resides in Roxas St., Dinalupihan, Bataan, filed with the city Court of Olongapo, an ejectment suit against private respondent Prescila de los Santos wo leases for P130.00 per month a room in the former’s residential house at No. 65, 14th St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, on the ground that petitioner need the leased premises for a medical clinic for her daughter.
Private respondent move to dismiss the complaint for petitioner’s failure to bring the controversy before the Lupon Barangay for conciliation or settlement which is a precondition to the filing of the complaint, pursuant to PD No. 1508.

HELD:

Sec 3 of PD No. 1508 is a rule on venue. It presupposes that a controversy is within the jurisdiction of a Lupong Barangay. It by no means signifies that all controversies involving interest in real property are within the jurisdiction of the Lupon Barangay where the property is situation.

In the case at bar, the Lupon Barangay has no jurisdiction because the parties involved are not residents in the same barangay, nor in barangays within the same city nor in barangays adjoining each other. Since no Lupon Barangay has jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy between petitioner and private respondent, no question of venue anent the barangays where the complaint should be litigated can be invoked PD 1508 is not applicable and, necessarily, Sec 3 of said decree is not invocable for the dismissal of this ejectment suit.

Tavora vs. Veloso

Tavora vs. Veloso, 117 SCRA 613

September 30, 1982


FACTS:
Tavora, a resident of Marikina MM, filed an ejectment case against Veloso, who leases at former’s apartment in Quiapo, MM. City Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to failure of petitioner to bring the dispute first to the barangay court for possible amicable settlement under PD No. 1508.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the barangay lupon has jurisdiction over the dispute between Tavora and Veloso.

RULING:

Sec 2 of PD 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) states the condition which the lupon of the barangay shall have authority to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute.


Sec 3 of said PD states that the disputants must be actually residing in the same barangay or in different barangays within the same city or municipality, it unequivocally declares that the lupon shall have no authority over disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipality, except where such barangays adjoin each other.

SAN JUAN vs SCS, DBM & ALMAJOSE

Reynaldo R. San Juan vs CSC, DBM, Cecilia Almajose
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991

FACTS:
The position of Provincial Budget Officer for the Province of Rizal was left vacant on March 22, 1988.

Provincial Governor, petitioner informed the Director of DBM that Ms. Dalisay Santos, then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal, assumed offices as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 and requested the Director of DBM to endorse the appointment of Ms. Santos to the position of PBO. DBM Regional Director found Cecilia Almajose, among the nominees of the petitioner to be the most qualified and recommended to the DBM Secretary the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal, which the DBM USec signed the appointment papers of Almajose as PBO.

Upon learning of Almajose’s appointment, petitioner wrote DBM Sec protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that the DBM Usec is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO, that Almajose lacks the required 3 yrs works experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31, and that under EO No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the DBM has the power to appoint the PBO without violating the principle of Local Autonomy.

RULING:
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy but distinguished presidential control to supervision:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)"

The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.

Article II, S. 25, 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."

The 14 sections in Article X, on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
"Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION II CHAPTER 2



CHAPTER 2: 
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION


A. NATURE AND PURPOSE

Definition
          It is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided in the law.

Construction and Interpretation, Distinguished
          Interpretation is the art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of word.
      Construction is the process of drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct 

Rule of Construction, generally
          The legislature is presumed to know the rules of statutory construction, it enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in case of doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation. Where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, courts employ canons of statutory construction to ascertain and give effect to its true intent and meaning. 
          The legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction as part of the provisions of a statute.  The legislature also defines, in certain complicated statutes, the word and phrases used therein.  Except as they may have been embodied as part of a statute, rules of construction have no binding effect on the courts.  Nor are they controlling in the interpretation of laws, they may only be used to clarify, not to defeat, legislative intent.  Even those rules of construction which are in the form of statutory provisions may be ignored if their employment may defeat, rather than effectuate, legislative intent.

Purpose/Object of Construction
          All rules of construction of interpretation have for their sole object the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature.  The object of all judicial interpretation of a statute is to determine legislative intent, what intention is conveyed, either expressly or impliedly, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for ascertaining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the court comes within it.

Legislative Intent
          Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when it leads away from the true intent of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act (Torres v. Limjap).  Where the statute is susceptible of more than one construction, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the legislature (U.S. v. Toribio).

Legislative Purpose
          It is the reason why a particular statute was enacted by the legislature.  A legislation is an active instrument of the government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that law have ends to be achieved and statutes should be so construed so as not defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Litex Employees Assn v. Eduvala).

Legislative Meaning
          It is what the law, by its language, means.  It may be synonymous to legislative intent.  If there is ambiguity in the language, its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead to what the legislative intent is.

Matters Inquired into in Construing a Statute
          It is not enough to ascertain the intention of meaning of the statute; it is also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning of the statute has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity.  The legal act is made up of two elements – an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression.  Failure of the latter may defeat the former.

Where Legislative Intent is Ascertained
          The primary source of the intent is the statute itself and has to be discovered from the four corners of the law (Manila Lodge No. 761 v. C. A).  It has to be extracted from the statute as a whole and not from an isolated part of particular provision thereof.  Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed (Veroy v. Layague).  The court may also look to the purpose of the statute to be subserved, the reason or cause which induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its passage (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad).



B. POWER TO CONSTRUE

Construction is a Judicial Function
          It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is and it has the final word as to what the law means.  The court does not interpret the law in a vacuum.  It does not give legal opinion on hypothetical cases or in cases which have become moot or academic

Legislature Cannot Overrule Judicial Decisions 
      The legislature has no power to overrule the interpretation or construction of a statute of the Constitution by the Supreme court and while it may indicate its construction of a statute in a resolution or declaratory act, it cannot preclude the courts from giving the statute a different interpretation.

When Judicial Interpretation May be Set Aside
      The Supreme Court may change or overrule its previous construction.  Constitutional amendments may modify or nullify a judicial interpretation of a provision thereof.  The rule that the Supreme Court has the final word in the interpretation of a statute merely means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the judicial construction without modifying or repealing the very statute which has been the subject of construction, but when it enacts a repeal, the previous judicial construction of the statute is modified or set aside.

When Court May Construe Statute
          A condition sine qua non, before the court may construe or interpret, is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction (Daong v. Municipal Judge).  A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one interpretation.

Courts May not Construe Where Statute is Clear
          Construction comes only after it has been demonstrated that the application is impossible or inadequate without it.  It is the very last function which the court should exercise, for it there is more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico).  It has been repeatedly declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation and there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga).
          For nothing is better settled than that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they find it, not as they like it to be.  Fidelity to such a task precludes construction unless application is impossible or inadequate without it (Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General).
          Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Luzon Surety Co. v. De Garcia).
          Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose, nor may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated (Ramos v. C.A), nor construe provisions by taking into account questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non compliance therewith.
          Administrative agencies tasked to implement a stature may not construe it by expanding its meaning where provisions are clear and unambiguous.

Rulings of Supreme Court Part of Legal System
          Legis interpretato legis vim obtinet, the authoritative interpretation of the Supreme Court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment, since the court’s interpretation merely establishes the contemporatneous legislative intent that the statute thus construed intends to effectuate (Senovila v. Hermosisimo).
          Stare decisis et non quieta movere, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.  This assures certainty and stability in the legal system.
          As part of the legal system and until reversed by the Supreme Court itself, rulings of the highest tribunal are binding upon inferior courts.

Judicial Rulings have no Retroactive Effect
          Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward.  The interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court remains to be part of the legal system until the latter overrules it and the new doctrine overruling the old is applied prospectively in favor of persons who have relied thereon in good faith.

Courts May Issue Guideline in Construing Statute 
          In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread on sensitive areas of constitutional rights, the court may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law requires.  This is not judicial legislation but an act to define what the law is.


C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE

Courts may not Enlarge or Restrict Statutes

  1. While statutory constructions involves choice, the court should resist the temptation to roam at will and rely on its predilection as to what policy should prevail.
  2. They may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers.
  3. They are not authorize to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.
  4. They should not revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law
  5. Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe
  6. Neither should courts construe statutes which are perfectly vague, or cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

COURTS NOT TO BE INFLUENCED BY QUESTIONS OF WISDOM
          Since the legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law, courts may not take any of these matters into account in construing or interpreting the law.  As long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION II CHAPTER 3



CHAPTER 3: 
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION


A. IN GENERAL

           Intrinsic aids - aids to construction are those found in the printed page of the statute itself,
           Extrinsic aids - Extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page.

Title
          The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.  The rule that the title may serve as a guide carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional requirement that every bill shall have one subject as expressed in the title thereof.

When Resort to title not authorized
           When the text is clear it is improper to resort to its title to make it obscure.   

Preamble
          It is that part of the stature written immediately after its title which states the purpose, reason or justification for the enactment of the law and usually expressed in the form of “whereas” clauses.  Though it is not, strictly speaking, a part of a statute, it is the key to the statute for its sets out the intention of the legislature.  It may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law, or require, in the commission of a crime, an element not clearly expressed in its text.  It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively, in which case the law has to be given retroactive effect, so as to carry out such intent (PNB v. Office of the President).

Context of Whole Text
          Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration of the whole context of the stature and not from an isolated part of particular provision (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu).  The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute, it may give to a word or phrase a meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification.  In such a case, the meaning dictated by the context prevails.
          Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.  The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view (Commissioner of Internal Reveneu v. TMX Sales).

Punctuation Marks
          A semi-colon - indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma; and what follows a semi-colon must have a relation to the same matter which precedes it.   
         The comma and the semi-colon are both used for the same purpose – to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference is that semi-colon makes the division a little more pronounced.  They are not used to introduce a new idea.
          Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written word.  

Capitalization of Letters
          Like punctuation marks, capitalization is an aid of low degree in the construction of statute. Example: in a statute which provides that  “ a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which…” , in force at a time when the Philippines was still a territory of the US, the fact that the words “state and country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded form the phrase “another state or country.”

Headnotes, Headings or Epigraphs
        Are convenient index to the contents of its provisions. However they are not entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn therefrom are of little value and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clause, for they are not part of the law. Secondary aids, such as headnotes or epigraphs, may be consulted to remove, but not to create nor to limit or control the plain language of the law.

Lingual text
          Philippine laws are officially promulgated either in English, Spanish or Filipino, or either in two such languages. The rule is that, unless otherwise provided, where a statute is officially promulgated in English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English text.

Intent or spirit of the law
          The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. For this reason, legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute.

Policy of law
          The policy of the law once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy.

Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
           The court much look to the object to be accomplished, the evils to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effectuate its purpose.

Dictionaries
          While definition s given by lexicographers are not binding, courts have adopted, in proper cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning of the particular words or terms used in a statute, esp where no strong reason exists why their dictionary meaning should not be adopted in the construction of the statute.

Consequences of various constructions
          In construing a statute, the objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable and sensible interpretation that is in full accord with the legislative intent. As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause injustice or hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislative intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object, render certain words or phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or make any of its provisions nugatory.
         
Presumptions
          Include: presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, of its completeness, of its prospective operation, of right and justice, of its effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole, as well as those against the inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law, impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, inconvenience, and ineffectiveness.


B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Generally
          It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that where a statue is susceptible of several interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute.

What constitutes legislative history
          If the statute is based on, or is a revision of, a prior statute, the latter’s practical application and judicial construction, the various amendments it underwent, and the contemporary events at the time of its enactment form part of its legislative history. If the statute is borrowed from, or modeled upon, Anglo-American precedents or other foreign sources, its history includes the history of such precedents, and for a proper construction of the statue sought to be construed, it is oftentimes essential to review such legislative history and find authoritative guide for its interpretation from such precedents, their practical application , and the decisions of the courts construing and applying such precedents in the country of origin.

President’s message to legislature
The president’s message indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation which, when enacted into law, follows his line of thinking on the matter.

Explanatory Note
          Where there is ambiguity in a statue or where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute

Legislative Debates, views and deliberations
Courts may resort to the legislative deliberations in the legislature on a bill which eventually was enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its provisions. Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted.
However the views expressed by the legislators during the deliberation of a bill as to the bill’s purpose, meaning, or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law.
The opinions expressed by legislators in the course of debates concerning the application of existing laws are not also given decisive weight, especially where the legislator was not a member of the assembly that enacted said laws.

Reports of commissions
In the codification of laws, commissions are usually formed to compile and collate all laws on particular subject and to prepare the draft of the proposed code

Prior law from which statute is based
          In ascertaining the intention of the lawmaker, courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents of the statute involved.

Change in phraseology by amendments
          The change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. In construing the amended provision, courts may investigate the history of the provision to ascertain legislative intent as to the meaning or scope of the amended law.
         
Amendment by deletion
          As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicate that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not to effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

Exceptions to the rule
          The rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a change in meaning from that which the statute originally had applies only when the deleted words or phrases are not surplusage or when the intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the old law. The rule does not apply where the intent, as shown by history of the enactment, is clear that the amendment is precisely to plainly express that construction of the act prior to its amendment because its language is not sufficiently expressive of such construction.

Adopted statute
          The general rule is that where local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of another country, the decisions of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes. The reason is that the legislature, in adopting from another country a statute which has previously received judicial construction in that country, is deemed to have adopted the statute with such construction and practical application in the country of origin.
          The adopted statutes are thus generally construed in accordance with the construction given similar statutes in the US, unless special reasons, local customs, and practice require otherwise.

Limitations to the rule
          The general rule that a statute which has been adopted from that of a foreign country should be construed in accordance with the construction given it in the country of origin is not without limitations.

Principles of common law
          While common law as known in Anglo-American jurisprudence is not in force in this country, save only insofar as it is founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in conflict with existing laws, nevertheless many of the principles of the common law have been imported into this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and establishment of institutions similar those of the United States. Courts may thus properly resort to common law principles in construing doubtful provisions of a statute, particularly where such statute is modeled upon Anglo-American precedents. However there is a conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails.

Conditions at time of enactment
          In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have taken into account the existing conditions of things at the time of its enactment. For this reason, it is proper, in the interpretation of a statute to consider the physical conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtaining which must of necessity affect its operation in order to reach an understanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as to the meaning of the statute.

History of times
          The court may look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the statue was enacted, and interpret it in the light of the conditions obtaining. Generally, it may be said that in determining the meaning, intent and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.


C. CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION

Generally
          Contemporary or practical constructions are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors.
Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege--- the contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Kinds of Executive Construction, generally
          What is commonly known as contemporaneous construction is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administer such statute. Accordingly, executive and the administrative officers are generally the very first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement. 
Three type of executive interpretations: 
(1) construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to implement the law, expressed or implied, expressed such as circular, directive, or regulation; 
(2) by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government, in the form of opinions issued upon the request of the executive 
(3) interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.

Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction
          Generally speaking, where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the executive or administrative officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted, if necessary to resolve the doubt. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of the legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts. As aptly said in a case: “the principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it.”

Weight accorded to usage and practice  
-Optimus interpres rerum usus- the best interpreter of the law is usage


Construction of rules and regulations
          An administrative agency has the power to interpret its own rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rules.

Reasons why contemporaneous construction is given much weight
       (1)it comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed. 
         (2) executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. 
        (3) there are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. In short, due to their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment. And there is a need for certainty and predictability in the law.

When contemporaneous construction disregarded
          It is neither controlling nor binding upon the court. The court may disregard the law CC, where there is no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the statue a different interpretation. If it is erroneous then should be declared null and void.
         
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction nor create rights; exceptions
          The error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. As a rule, an erroneous CC creates no vested right on the part of those who relied upon, and followed such construction. A vested right may not arise from a wrong interpretation of a law by an administrative or executive officer whose primary duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law. And the government is never estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its agents.
          The rule is not absolute, but admits exceptions in the interest of justice and fair play. (true in tax cases)

Legislative interpretation
          The fact that the interpretation of a statue is primarily a judicial function does not preclude the legislature form indicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law. It may thus provide in the statute itself an interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how its provisions should be construed.  It may also define the terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a previous law or pass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as to given statute. However the legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted to the courts to interpret the law. While their interpretation is not controlling, the courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language thereof. It is entitled of respectful consideration.

Legislative approval
      The legislature may by action or inaction, approve or ratify such contemporaneous construction. It may be manifested in many ways: as when it reenacts a statute previously given a CC, uses words similar in their import to the language of an earlier law which has received a practical application or amend a prior statute without, in the amending act, providing anything which would restrict, change or nullify the precious CC placed upon the prior law. It may be also shown by the legislature appropriating money for the officer designated to perform a task pursuant to an interpretation of a statute. Where the legislature has notice or knowledge of a construction placed upon a statue by an executive officer charged with its implementation, without repudiating it, its silence is acquiescence equivalent to consent to continue practice. There is an implied approval by its failure to change a longstanding administrative construction.
          Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur- legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

Reenactment
          The most common act of legislative approval of CC of a state is by reenactment. The principle is the reenactment of a statute, previously given CC, is a persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction. It must be reenacted and not merely amended and the CC thereof must be in the form of regulation to implement the law and duly published and not merely administrative ruling embodied in a letter to a specified individual and not published. It is accorded with greater weight and respect than the CC of the statute before its ratification. The reason for such is: there is an agreement between two departments – the legislative and executive— to the meaning of the law, and it devolves upon the judiciary to give it deferential treatment. 

Stare decisis
        The decision of the SC applying or interpreting a statute is controlling with respect to the interpretation of that statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other statutes of similar import. The reason: the SC’s interpretation forms part of the statue itself and of the legal system and comes form that branch of government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the law.
       Stare decisis et non quieta movere- one should follow past precedents and should not be disturbed what has been settled. The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in the law. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium—the interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.
        For a ruling of SC be under the doctrine of stare decisis, it must be a direct ruling and not through sub silencio and obiter dictum.
        The facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied should be the same for stare decisis to be applied.
          The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. The principle does not blind adherence to precedents. If it is found contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. However only the SC itself can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it, neither by inferior court, nor by legislature unless they repeal or amend the law itself. If the inferior courts feel that the precedent is against their way of reasoning, they may state their personal opinion but still they are bound to follow it.