CHAPTER 3:
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
A. IN GENERAL
Intrinsic aids - aids to construction are those found in
the printed page of the statute itself,
Extrinsic
aids - Extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page.
Title
The title may indicate the legislative
intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a
language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative
intent as disclosed in its title. The
rule that the title may serve as a guide carries more weight in this
jurisdiction because of the constitutional requirement that every bill shall
have one subject as expressed in the title thereof.
When the text is clear it is improper to resort to its title to make it obscure.
Preamble
It is that part of the stature written
immediately after its title which states the purpose, reason or justification
for the enactment of the law and usually expressed in the form of “whereas”
clauses. Though it is not, strictly
speaking, a part of a statute, it is the key to the statute for its sets out
the intention of the legislature. It may
restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law, or require, in
the commission of a crime, an element not clearly expressed in its text. It may express the legislative intent to make
the law apply retroactively, in which case the law has to be given retroactive
effect, so as to carry out such intent (PNB v. Office of the President).
Context of Whole Text
Legislative intent should accordingly
be ascertained from a consideration of the whole context of the stature and not
from an isolated part of particular provision (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City
of Cebu). The context may circumscribe
the meaning of a statute, it may give to a word or phrase a meaning different
from its usual or ordinary signification.
In such a case, the meaning dictated by the context prevails.
Every section, provision or clause of
the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at
the effect contemplated by the legislature.
The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text
of the law and every part of the act is taken into view (Commissioner of
Internal Reveneu v. TMX Sales).
Punctuation Marks
A semi-colon - indicate a
separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed
by a comma; and what follows a semi-colon must have a relation to the same
matter which precedes it.
The comma and
the semi-colon are both used for the same purpose – to divide sentences and
parts of sentences, the only difference is that semi-colon makes the division a
little more pronounced. They are not
used to introduce a new idea.
Punctuation marks are aids of low
degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written
word.
Capitalization of Letters
Like
punctuation marks, capitalization is an aid of low degree in the construction
of statute. Example: in a statute which provides that “ a will made within the Philippine Islands
by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which…” , in force at a time when the Philippines was
still a territory of the US, the fact that the words “state and country” are
not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded form the
phrase “another state or country.”
Headnotes, Headings or Epigraphs
Are convenient index to the
contents of its provisions. However they are not entitled too much weight, and
inferences drawn therefrom are of little value and they can never control the
plain terms of the enacting clause, for they are not part of the law. Secondary
aids, such as headnotes or epigraphs, may be consulted to remove, but not to
create nor to limit or control the plain language of the law.
Lingual text
Philippine
laws are officially promulgated either in English, Spanish or Filipino, or
either in two such languages. The rule is that, unless otherwise provided,
where a statute is officially promulgated in English and Spanish, the English
text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the Spanish
may be consulted to explain the English text.
Intent or spirit of the law
The
intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. For this reason, legislative
intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light
in the application and interpretation of a statute.
Policy of law
The
policy of the law once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One
way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a
construction that will promote public policy.
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
The court much look to the object to be
accomplished, the evils to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and
should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best
effectuate its purpose.
Dictionaries
While
definition s given by lexicographers are not binding, courts have adopted, in
proper cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning of
the particular words or terms used in a statute, esp where no strong reason
exists why their dictionary meaning should not be adopted in the construction
of the statute.
Consequences of various constructions
In
construing a statute, the objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable
and sensible interpretation that is in full accord with the legislative intent.
As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will
cause injustice or hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislative intent or
spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object, render
certain words or phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or make any of its
provisions nugatory.
Presumptions
Include:
presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, of its
completeness, of its prospective operation, of right and justice, of its
effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole, as well as
those against the inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law,
impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, inconvenience, and
ineffectiveness.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Generally
It
is a well settled rule of statutory construction that where a statue is
susceptible of several interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its
language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of
the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute.
What constitutes legislative history
If
the statute is based on, or is a revision of, a prior statute, the latter’s
practical application and judicial construction, the various amendments it
underwent, and the contemporary events at the time of its enactment form part
of its legislative history. If the statute is borrowed from, or modeled upon,
Anglo-American precedents or other foreign sources, its history includes the
history of such precedents, and for a proper construction of the statue sought
to be construed, it is oftentimes essential to review such legislative history
and find authoritative guide for its interpretation from such precedents, their
practical application , and the decisions of the courts construing and applying
such precedents in the country of origin.
President’s message to legislature
The president’s
message indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation which, when enacted
into law, follows his line of thinking on the matter.
Explanatory Note
Where
there is ambiguity in a statue or where a statute is susceptible of more than
one interpretation, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the
ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute
Legislative Debates, views and
deliberations
Courts may resort
to the legislative deliberations in the legislature on a bill which eventually
was enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its provisions. Thus, where
there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which
was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on
the bill may be adopted.
However the views
expressed by the legislators during the deliberation of a bill as to the bill’s
purpose, meaning, or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the
law.
The opinions
expressed by legislators in the course of debates concerning the application of
existing laws are not also given decisive weight, especially where the
legislator was not a member of the assembly that enacted said laws.
Reports of commissions
In the codification
of laws, commissions are usually formed to compile and collate all laws on
particular subject and to prepare the draft of the proposed code
Prior law from which statute is based
In
ascertaining the intention of the lawmaker, courts are permitted to look to
prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents of the
statute involved.
Change in phraseology by amendments
The
change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had. In construing the amended provision, courts may investigate the
history of the provision to ascertain legislative intent as to the meaning or
scope of the amended law.
Amendment by deletion
As
a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute
indicate that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute,
for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion
had the intention been not to effect a change in its meaning. The amended
statute should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous
to its amendment.
Exceptions to the rule
The
rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a change in meaning from that
which the statute originally had applies only when the deleted words or phrases
are not surplusage or when the intention is clear to change the previous
meaning of the old law. The rule does not apply where the intent, as shown by
history of the enactment, is clear that the amendment is precisely to plainly
express that construction of the act prior to its amendment because its
language is not sufficiently expressive of such construction.
Adopted statute
The
general rule is that where local statutes are patterned after or copied from
those of another country, the decisions of the courts in such country
construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of
such local statutes. The reason is that the legislature, in adopting from
another country a statute which has previously received judicial construction
in that country, is deemed to have adopted the statute with such construction
and practical application in the country of origin.
The
adopted statutes are thus generally construed in accordance with the
construction given similar statutes in the US, unless special reasons, local
customs, and practice require otherwise.
Limitations to the rule
The
general rule that a statute which has been adopted from that of a foreign
country should be construed in accordance with the construction given it in the
country of origin is not without limitations.
Principles of common law
While
common law as known in Anglo-American jurisprudence is not in force in this
country, save only insofar as it is founded on sound principles applicable to
local conditions and is not in conflict with existing laws, nevertheless many
of the principles of the common law have been imported into this jurisdiction
as a result of the enactment of laws and establishment of institutions similar
those of the United States. Courts may thus properly resort to common law
principles in construing doubtful provisions of a statute, particularly where such
statute is modeled upon Anglo-American precedents. However there is a conflict
between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails.
Conditions at time of enactment
In
enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have taken into account the
existing conditions of things at the time of its enactment. For this reason, it
is proper, in the interpretation of a statute to consider the physical
conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtaining which must of
necessity affect its operation in order to reach an understanding as to the
intent of the legislature, or as to the meaning of the statute.
History of times
The
court may look to the history of the times, examine the state of things
existing when the statue was enacted, and interpret it in the light of the
conditions obtaining. Generally, it may be said that in determining the
meaning, intent and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history
of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to
bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good
to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.
C. CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION
Generally
Contemporary
or practical constructions are the constructions placed upon statutes at the
time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial
authorities, as well as those who, because of their involvement in the process
of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as
draftsmen and bill sponsors.
Contemporanea
exposition est optima et fortissima in lege--- the contemporary construction is
strongest in law.
Kinds of Executive Construction, generally
What
is commonly known as contemporaneous construction is the construction placed
upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to
execute or administer such statute. Accordingly, executive and the
administrative officers are generally the very first officials to interpret the
law, preparatory to its enforcement.
Three type of executive interpretations:
(1) construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to
implement the law, expressed or implied, expressed such as circular, directive,
or regulation;
(2) by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief
legal adviser of the government, in the form of opinions issued upon the
request of the executive
(3) interpretation handed down in an adversary
proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising
quasi-judicial power.
Weight accorded to contemporaneous
construction
Generally
speaking, where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
the uniform construction placed upon it by the executive or administrative
officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted, if necessary to resolve
the doubt. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the
spirit of the legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency,
the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts. As aptly said in
a case: “the principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of
the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no
authorities need be cited to support it.”
Weight accorded to usage and practice
-Optimus interpres rerum usus- the best
interpreter of the law is usage
Construction of rules and regulations
An
administrative agency has the power to interpret its own rules and such
interpretation becomes part of the rules.
Reasons why contemporaneous construction is
given much weight
(1)it comes from the
particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus
construed.
(2) executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves
with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law,
and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion
thereon.
(3) there are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. In
short, due to their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment.
And there is a need for certainty and predictability in the law.
When contemporaneous construction
disregarded
It
is neither controlling nor binding upon the court. The court may disregard the
law CC, where there is no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has
previously given the statue a different interpretation. If it is erroneous then
should be declared null and void.
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does
not preclude correction nor create rights; exceptions
The
error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. As a rule, an
erroneous CC creates no vested right on the part of those who relied upon, and
followed such construction. A vested right may not arise from a wrong
interpretation of a law by an administrative or executive officer whose primary
duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law. And the government is never
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its agents.
The
rule is not absolute, but admits exceptions in the interest of justice and fair
play. (true in tax cases)
Legislative interpretation
The
fact that the interpretation of a statue is primarily a judicial function does
not preclude the legislature form indicating its construction of a statute it
enacts into law. It may thus provide in the statute itself an interpretative or
declaratory clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how its
provisions should be construed. It may
also define the terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a
previous law or pass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as to given
statute. However the legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted to
the courts to interpret the law. While their interpretation is not controlling,
the courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language thereof. It is
entitled of respectful consideration.
Legislative approval
The
legislature may by action or inaction, approve or ratify such contemporaneous
construction. It may be manifested in many ways: as when it reenacts a statute
previously given a CC, uses words similar in their import to the language of an
earlier law which has received a practical application or amend a prior statute
without, in the amending act, providing anything which would restrict, change
or nullify the precious CC placed upon the prior law. It may be also shown by
the legislature appropriating money for the officer designated to perform a
task pursuant to an interpretation of a statute. Where the legislature has
notice or knowledge of a construction placed upon a statue by an executive
officer charged with its implementation, without repudiating it, its silence is
acquiescence equivalent to consent to continue practice. There is an implied
approval by its failure to change a longstanding administrative construction.
Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur-
legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate
Reenactment
The
most common act of legislative approval of CC of a state is by reenactment. The
principle is the reenactment of a statute, previously given CC, is a persuasive
indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction. It
must be reenacted and not merely amended and the CC thereof must be in the form
of regulation to implement the law and duly published and not merely
administrative ruling embodied in a letter to a specified individual and not
published. It is accorded with greater weight and respect than the CC of the
statute before its ratification. The reason for such is: there is an agreement
between two departments – the legislative and executive— to the meaning of the
law, and it devolves upon the judiciary to give it deferential treatment.
Stare decisis
The
decision of the SC applying or interpreting a statute is controlling with
respect to the interpretation of that statute and is of greater weight than
that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other
statutes of similar import. The reason: the SC’s interpretation forms part of
the statue itself and of the legal system and comes form that branch of
government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the law.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere- one should follow
past precedents and should not be disturbed what has been settled. The rule
rests on the desirability of having stability in the law. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium—the interest of the state
demands that there be an end to litigation.
For
a ruling of SC be under the doctrine of stare decisis, it must be a direct
ruling and not through sub silencio and obiter dictum.
The
facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied should be the same
for stare decisis to be applied.
The
rule of stare decisis is not absolute. The principle does not blind adherence
to precedents. If it is found contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle
should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law.
However only the SC itself can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it,
neither by inferior court, nor by legislature unless they repeal or amend the
law itself. If the inferior courts feel that the precedent is against their way
of reasoning, they may state their personal opinion but still they are bound to
follow it.
