CHAPTER FOUR :
Adherence to, or Departure From, Language of Statute
A.
LITERAL
INTERPRETATION
Literal Meaning or
plain-meaning rule: Verba legis
As a general rule,
the intent of legislature to be ascertained and thereafter given effect is the
intent expressed in the language of the statute.
Index animi sermo: speech is the index
of intention.
Verba Legis non est
recedendum:
from the words of a statute there should be no departure. What
is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those matters outside
its scope.
To
depart from the meaning expressed by words is to alter the statute, to legislate
and not to Maledicta est
expositioquae corrumpit textum: or it is dangerous construction which is
against the text.
Dura
Lex Sed Lex
The law may be harsh, but it is still the
law.
Absoluta sentential
expositore non indigent: When the language of the law is clear, no explanation
of it is required. It must be applied
regardless who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous.
Hoc quidem perquam
durum est, sed ita lex scripta est, or it is exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.
The
court should apply the law even if it would be harsh or unwise.
When
the law is clear, appeal to justice and equity as justification to construe it
differently are unavailing. Equity is described as justice outside legality,
which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may supplement the law.
Aequitas nunquam
contravenit legis:
Equity never acts in contravention of the law.
B.
DEPARTURE FROM
LITERAL MEANING
Statute must be
capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative.
Court
must use every authorized means to ascertain the intent of the statute and give
it an intelligible meaning. If effort is impossible to solve the doubt and
dispel the obscurity of a statute, if no judicial certainty can be had as to
its meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to make one.
If
statute fails to express a meaning, judicial modesty forbids court from
assuming and from supplying a meaning thereto.
Interpretatio
fienda est ut res magis valeatquam pereat: that interpretation as will give
the thing efficacy is to be adopted. A law should be interpreted with a view to
upholding rather than destroying it.
What is within the spirit is within the law.
The
intent or spirit of the law is the law itself.
As
a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit of the statute is not
within the statute.
The
intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent.
The
court may consider the spirit and reason of statute where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.
Literal import must
yield to intent.
The
intention controls the literal interpretation of a particular language of
statute.
Verba intentioni,
non e contra, debent inservire: words ought to be more subservient to the
intent and not the intent to the words.
If
there’s two conflicting theories, courts choose which best accords with the
spirit or intent of the law.
Conscience
and equity should always be considered in the construction of a statute.
The
spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over its letter.
Limitation of rule
What
is within the spirit of a statute even if not within the letter is applicable
only if there is ambiguity in the language of the law.
Construction to
accomplish purpose
Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Courts
should not follow the letter of a statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the purpose of the act.
As
between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law should prevail. è
why? The general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule
which grammar or formal logic may lay down. (Holmes).
A
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results.
When reason of law
ceases, the law itself ceases: "Cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex"
Raton legis est
anima:
the reason of the law is its soul.
The
reason behind the law is the heart of the law. Reason of the law plays a
decisive role in its construction.
A
statute may render a prior law devoid of reason.
Where
a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior statute on the same
subject, the latter has lost all meaning and function and has ceased to exist.
Supplying
legislative omission
Where
a literal import of the language of a statute shows that words have been
omitted that should have been in the statute in order to carry out its intent
and spirit, clearly ascertainable from the context, the court may supply the
omission to make the statute conform to the obvious intent of the legislature
or to prevent the act from being absurd.
Rule
is corollary with the rule that what is within the spirit of the law is within
the law.
Correcting Clerical
errors
The
court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct
clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected would render the
statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its
intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of
the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.
It
is the duty of the court to arrive at the legislative intent.
Qualification of
rule
What
the courts may correct to reflect intention of legislature are those which are
clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, misprints.
To
correct a clear statute would be rewriting the law and do judicial legislation
in the disguise of interpretation.
Construction to
avoid absurdity
General
terms of a statute should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
absurdities. It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language which would avoid absurd consequences.
Interpretatio talis
in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum: Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation
as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Where
literal adherence to the language would result to absurdity, the court has the
power to supply or omit the words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd
result.
Courts
test the law by its result. There are laws which are generally valid but may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstance. Courts are not bound to apply them in slavish obedience to their
language.
A
law should not be interpreted so as not to cause injustice.
Where
a term is defined in a statute, the court may not construe it to exclude what
is included therein as to restrict its scope.
Construction to
avoid injustice
The
presumption is that the legislature in enacting a law, did not intent to work a
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another.
Ea est accipienda
interpretatio quae vitio caret: that interpretation is to be adopted
which is free from evil or injustice.
Construction to avoid
danger to public interest
It
is a well established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result, or great public interest will be endangered or
sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a particular construction of a statute,
such construction is to be avoided.
Courts
should presume that such construction was not intended by the legislature.
Construction in
favor of right and justice
Any
doubt in the construction of a statute should be resolved in favor of right and
justice.
The
fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with respect to a
question before the court will not justify the latter from declining to render
judgment thereon.
Jure naturae aequum
est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which was
restated with ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. Courts invoke these
principles when the statutes are silent or obscure in order to arrive at a
solution that would respond to the vehement (passionate) urge of conscience.
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In
balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which
the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle.
Surplusage and
superfluity disregarded
Surplusagium non
noceat:
surplusage does not vitiate a statute.
Utile per inutile
non vitiatur: the useful is not vitiated
by the non-useful.
Where
a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to the
context or intent of the statute or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies
the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase, or clause may be
rejected as a surplusage and entirely ignored.
Redundant words may
be rejected
General
rule is that every effort should be made to give some meaning to every part of
a statute. This rule does not impose upon the courts an imperative obligation
to give every redundant word or phrase a special significance, contrary to the
manifest intention of the legislature.
A
possible interpretation which would defeat the whole purpose of the law is to
be rejected.
Obscure or missing
word or false description may not preclude construction
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Court
should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of
a statute.
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That
some words may be missing due to clerical errors or false description does not
preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise
clear.
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Falsa demonstration
non nocet, cum de corpore constat: False description does not preclude
construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute.
Exemption from
rigid application of law
Ibi quid
generaliter conceditur; inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus
basque, which
means that where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that
nothing shall be contrary to law and right.
Equity
and other compelling reasons may justify an exception to a rule even when the
rule does not provide any.
If
the application of law will prevent a fair and impartial inquiry into the
actual facts of a case, justice demands that the general rule should yield to
occasional exceptions.
Summum jus, summa
injuria:
the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice. Where
rigid and strict application of law would work injustice, an exemption
therefrom to prevent such result on humanitarian and equitable grounds is
warranted, although the literal import of the law suggests no such exemption.
Law does not
require the impossible
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The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossibile. In other words, there is no obligation
to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium
nulla obligation est.
Number and gender
of words
A
plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, just as
a singular word may embrace two or more persons or things.
It
is also a rule of statutory construction that in construing a statute, the
masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in
which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise.
C.
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of
necessary implication
What
is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for future events, thereby creating gaps in the law. One
of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine
of necessary implication.
Ex necessitate
legis - from the necessity of the law.
In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus. Every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege.
“necessary
implication”: it is one which under the circumstances, is compelled by a
reasonable view of the statute, and the contrary of which would be improbable
and absurd.
“Necessity”:
defines what may properly and logically be inferred from and read into the
statute.
This
doctrine may not be used to justify the inclusion in a statute of what to the
court appears to be wise and just, unless it is at the same time necessarily
and logically within its terms.
What
may be necessarily implied from a statute should, in any event, be consistent
with, and not contrary to, the constitution or to existing laws. An implication
which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted.
Remedy applied from
a right
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Where
there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi
jus, ibi remedium
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The
fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from
vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right.
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Such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislation must take their bearings.
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“wrong”
means deprivation or violation of a right, and is not equivalent to “error.”
Grant of
jurisdiction
Settled
is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is conferred only by the
Constitution or by the Statute.
Jurisdiction
cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to that effect.
What may be implied
from grant of jurisdiction
To
employ all writs, processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction
effective.
Power
to do all things which are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates, even though the court may be called to decide matters
which would not be within its cognizance as original caused of action.
It
can grant reliefs incidental to the main cause of action.
Grant of power
includes incidental power
As
a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in,
and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to
other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.
Power
conferred by law upon an administrative officer to issue rules and regulations
to carry out the purposes of a statute he is called upon to execute includes
the authority to delegate to a subordinate officer the performance of a
particular function, absent any express or implied provision to the contrary.
Grant of power
excludes greater power
The
principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to
make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are
greater than that conferred.
What is implied
should not be against the law.
The statutory grant
of power does not include such incidental power which cannot be exercised without violating the Constitution, the statute conferring the power, or other
laws on the same subject.
Authority to charge
against public funds may not be implied
Unless
a statute expressly so authorizes, no claim against public funds may be
allowed.
Illegality of act
implied from prohibition
Where
a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in violation thereof is
by implication null and void.
The
prohibited act cannot serve as a foundation of a cause of action for relief.
Ex dolo malo non
oritur:
no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or inequity
Nullus commodum
capere potest de injuria sua propria: no man should be allowed to take advantage
of his own wrong: In pari
delicto potior est condition defendentis
Exceptions to the
rule
The
principle of pari delicto recognizes
certain exceptions.
It
will not apply when its enforcement or application will violate an avowed
fundamental policy or public interest.
Another
exemption is that when the transaction is not illegal per se but merely
prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of one
party, the court may grant relief in favor of the latter.
What cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly
Quando aliquid
prohibetur ex directo, prohibeturet per obliquum
What
the law prohibits cannot, in some other way, be legally accomplished.
There should be no
penalty for compliance of law.
For simple logic, fairness and reason
cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in
compliance with the law
